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Abstract—Artificial neural networks are well-known to
be susceptible to catastrophic forgetting when continually
learning from sequences of tasks. Various continual (or
“incremental”) learning approaches have been proposed to
avoid catastrophic forgetting, but they are typically adversary
agnostic, i.e., they do not consider the possibility of a
malicious attack. In this effort, we explore the vulnerability
of Elastic Weight Consolidation (EWC), a popular continual
learning algorithm for avoiding catastrophic forgetting. We
show that an intelligent adversary can bypass the EWC’s
defenses, and instead cause gradual and deliberate forgetting
by introducing small amounts of misinformation to the
model during training. We demonstrate such an adversary’s
ability to assume control of the model via injection of
“backdoor” attack samples on both permuted and split
benchmark variants of the MNIST dataset. Importantly, once
the model has learned the adversarial misinformation, the
adversary can then control the amount of forgetting of any
task. Equivalently, the malicious actor can create a “false
memory” about any task by inserting carefully-designed
backdoor samples to any fraction of the test instances of that
task. Perhaps most damaging, we show this vulnerability
to be very acute; neural network memory can be easily
compromised with the addition of backdoor samples into
as little as 1% of the training data of even a single task.
I. Introduction
Human memory is well-known to be susceptible to
false memory formation: the phenomenon where one’s
memory can be easily distorted through post-event mis-
information. Such misinformation can be self-inflicted;
the person convinces themself of the occurrence of cer-
tain events that did not in fact happen. False memory
formation can also be external: a malicious entity may
provide deliberate and persistent misinformation over a
period of time to convince an otherwise unsuspecting
victim of the adversary’s preferred—but inaccurate—
version of events.
In this effort, we explore the vulnerability of artificial
neural networks (ANNs) to adversarial false memory
formation, particularly when they are used for continual
/ incremental learning of a sequence of tasks. Despite
their considerable success in a variety of domains, ANNs
are still far from achieving the ultimate goal: artificial
general intelligence. Achieving such a level of intelli-
gence requires the ability to continually learn new tasks
over time: an innate and fundamental ability of human
intelligence [1].
Continual learning (CL)—also called life-long, sequen-
tial, or incremental learning—is the problem of learning
tasks sequentially from a stream of data [2]. A common
phenomenon plaguing CL is that of catastrophic forgetting
[3], where the level of performance acquired by the
model on some previously-learned task is partially or
completely lost (forgotten) while training to acquire new
knowledge for learning a subsequent task. Since the
knowledge of a model is described by its parameters,
loss of knowledge is characterized by the modification of
previously-learned parameters during subsequent train-
ing sessions. Catastrophic forgetting is also characterized
by the stability and plasticity dilemma [4], where stability
refers to the preservation of past knowledge, and plas-
ticity refers to the ability to integrate new knowledge.
While much of the research into ANNs is inspired by
humans’ ability to learn, humans notably do not suffer
from catastrophic forgetting in the same way. However,
humans do suffer from the related phenomenon of false
memory formation [5]. There has been considerable re-
search in the field of psychology on the “misinformation
effect”: the mechanism by which a false memory is in-
troduced, and how vulnerable the human memory is to
distorting influences [6]. While it may be unreasonable to
ascribe psychological properties to ANNs, it is important
to note the parallels between adversarial examples in
machine learning and the deliberate exposure to mis-
leading information—by a malicious actor—that distorts
the memory of their victim.
In this work, we pose the following question: Can an
adversary insert misinformation into an ANN, partic-
ularly in a CL setting, in order to distort its memory
of prior knowledge it has learned? We show that the
answer to this question is strongly affirmative, and that
such misinformation can be easily incorporated into the
memory of a continually-learning ANN through adver-
sarial backdoor poisoning attacks. We demonstrate this
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weakness against elastic weight consolidation (EWC) [1],
one of the more common and successful CL algorithms.
In particular, we show that EWC’s very mechanism to
retain prior knowledge can be easily exploited by an
adversary and used against the model itself. Further-
more, an adversary only needs to insert a small amount
of misinformation (in the form of a backdoor pattern)
into the training data of even a single task in order to
capture complete control of the model at test time. Such
a small, yet precise, attack is enough to make the model
learn misinformation with great confidence. Importantly,
the model will not forget this misinformation over time,
demonstrating the severity of such a poisoning attack
against continually-learning ANNs.
The direction of most work on continual learning has
typically been focused on solving supervised continual
learning for image classification [7]. Commonly known
as task-based sequential learning or task incremental learning,
this setting is characterized by the presentation of a
sequence of distinct tasks, learned one after the other.
It is important to highlight one of the most important
constraints in CL: the data used to learn a prior hypoth-
esis (or task) is no longer available when the model is
training to learn a new task [2].
CL approaches can be broadly categorized into three
different groups, namely, i) data-based approaches, ii)
architecture-based approaches, and iii) regularization-
based approaches. Data-based approaches either store orig-
inal data from previous tasks (violating the aforemen-
tioned constraint) or store a pseudo-representation of
the data in an episodic memory. The stored examples
from prior tasks are used together with the current
task’s training data to alleviate catastrophic forgetting.
Incremental classifier and representation learning [8],
gradient episodic memory [9], and averaged gradient
episodic memory [10] are examples of data based ap-
proaches.
Architectural approaches are based on the idea that
catastrophic forgetting can be reduced through assign-
ing different sub-networks to each task, i.e., a differ-
ent part of the network is selected for each different
task. Each sub-network is then trained specifically to
perform on each task, and is not further trained once
a new task is presented. Progressive neural networks
[11], expert gate [12], and ensemble based approaches—
such as the Learn++ [13] family of incremental learning
algorithms—are examples of architectural approaches.
Regularization-based approaches were proposed to avoid
the data storage and architectural complexity issues
associated with the previous two approaches. These
approaches add an extra regularization term to the loss
function to the prevent loss of prior knowledge while
learning new tasks. More specifically, regularization-
based approaches compute the importance weight of each
parameter in the network during (or after) learning a
particular task. Then, while learning subsequent tasks,
changes to the important parameters are penalized. All
approaches proposed under this family follow this prin-
ciple, but differ in the specific mechanism used to com-
pute the importance weights. Elastic weight consolida-
tion (EWC) [1], synaptic intelligence [14], and memory-
aware synapses [15] are examples of regularization-
based approaches.
All aforementioned CL approaches work reasonably
well in retaining prior knowledge, but their vulnerabil-
ity to adversarial attacks is unknown. We explore the
vulnerability of one of the more common regularization-
based approaches, elastic weight consolidation (EWC), to
adversarial poisoning attacks. We choose EWC due to its
popularity, its adherence to the no-prior-data constraint,
and its modest computational and memory requirements
in comparison to other approaches.
II. Adversarial Machine Learning
Adversarial machine learning is an emerging field
that explores the vulnerabilities of machine learning
algorithms to various attack scenarios. There are two
major types of adversarial attacks [16]: i) causative (or
poisoning) attacks, which target the training process by
adding strategically-chosen malicious data points into
the training data [17]–[19] such that maximum damage is
inflicted on the future generalization capabilities of the
classifier; and ii) exploratory (or evasion) attacks, which
exploit misclassification at the test time to discover blind
spots in the model or information about the data itself
[20]. Since CL approaches involve retraining the model
with each new batch of data (or each new task), the
adversary’s choice in targeting CL algorithms is typically
a poisoning attack.
Backdoor attacks are a specific class of poisoning
attacks, typically launched against ANNs in computer
vision applications [21], [22]. In backdoor attacks, the
malicious samples are created by tagging a small fraction
of training images with a special backdoor pattern. The
adversary assigns a false label of its choice to these
malicious samples, which are then added to the train-
ing set. The model is trained on this training dataset,
which contains both correctly-labeled images as well as
mislabeled, tagged images. The attacker’s goal is to force
the model to learn an association between the backdoor
pattern and the false class label. Once the model learns
this association, it performs well on clean (untagged) test
inputs during the testing (or “inference”) stage, while
causing targeted misclassification on any test data that
contains the backdoor pattern. The attacker is thereafter
empowered to employ targeted evasion attacks against
the model by applying the backdoor tag to any test
image of their choice. Because clean images are correctly
classified, this attack is particularly difficult to detect
using standard defenses; an unsuspecting victim may
only slowly (or never) become aware of the vulnerability
in their model, because the model performs as expected
except in the presence of the backdoor tag.
In this work, we explore the impact of the backdoor
attack strategy in the context of continual learning. First,
we examine the vulnerability of a CL model to the
gradual presentation of misinformation through back-
door samples over time. We also relax the conventional
backdoor requirement of adding a large amount of mis-
labeled samples at once; in a CL setting, an attack may
only require a small number of malicious samples (i.e.
small “bits” of misinformation). Such a strategy allows
the attacker to continuously add small amounts of mis-
information over time, reducing the likelihood of detec-
tion. Furthermore, we restrict the attacker to have access
only to training or test data. Previous research in one-
shot backdoor attacks have assumed access to both the
data and model parameters, an assumption that provides
undue (and rather unrealistic) capabilities to the attacker.
Our more conservative restriction further demonstrates
the severe vulnerability of CL algorithms to backdoor
attacks. Finally, we exploit the online properties of the
CL setting, observing that backdoor samples need not
be inserted into the training data of the specific task
being targeted. In fact, the backdoor information can be
inserted at any specifically-chosen time step(s) and still
have significant impact on the model’s performance on a
previously-learned task. This capability of launching an
attack at any time is critical, as it makes detection by the
defender even more difficult compared to a conventional
one-shot backdoor attack.
III. Approach & Attack Model
We consider the task incremental continual learning set-
ting, where a new task is received through its train-
ing data Xt and the corresponding labels yt at time t.
The goal of the task incremental setting is to learn a
model fθ , parameterized by θ, that minimizes the loss
function on all tasks received at time t = 1, ..., T seen so
far. Regularization approaches find the optimal param-
eter vector θ∗ by adding an extra regularization term
to the loss function of the model. This regularization
term penalizes changes to those parameters that were
deemed important during the previous tasks according
to the parameters’ importance matrix. The generalized
loss function `( fθ) of the model using regularization
approaches while learning current task at time t can
therefore be written as:
`( fθ) = `[ fθ(Xt), yt] + λ∑
i
(θt,i − θ∗t−1,i)2 It−1,i (1)
where `[ fθ(Xt), yt] is the model’s loss on the current task
at time t; It−1,i is the ith parameter’s importance matrix
computed for the previous task at time t − 1; θ∗t−1,i is
the optimal value of the ith parameter, learned for the
previous task at time t− 1; and λ is the regularization
coefficient. The common approach to find the importance
matrix for the previous task is to estimate a posterior
distribution over the parameters of the model, and to use
this distribution as a prior while learning the new task.
EWC estimates posterior distribution over the model’s
parameters through Laplace approximation by assuming
a Gaussian distribution, with mean given by the optimal
parameters found for the previous task (θ∗t−1,i) and a
precision given by the diagonal of the Fisher information
matrix F [1]. The importance matrix values for EWC are
obtained from F, which is computed empirically as the
squared derivative of the loss function `( fθ) with respect
to the optimal parameter vector θ∗t−1, obtained for the
previous task at the end of the training at time t − 1.
Hence, the importance matrix for EWC is computed as:
It−1,i =
(
∂`( fθ)
∂θ∗t−1,i
)2
(2)
The importance values obtained from Eq. 2 are then
used in Eq. 1. Consequently, EWC not only learns
the current task efficiently, but also retains the knowl-
edge from previous tasks by penalizing changes on the
“important” parameters learned during those previous
tasks.
Recalling that the goal of EWC is to retain prior knowl-
edge and avoid catastrophic forgetting of the previous
task(s) while learning the current task, the goal of the
adversary is then to force the algorithm to forget the
knowledge acquired on the previous task while learning
the current task. The attacker can achieve this goal via
the insertion of backdoor poisoning samples into the
training data of the current task. To create backdoor
attack samples, the attacker randomly selects a small
proportion (e.g. 1%) of the current task’s training data,
tags them with a specifically designed backdoor pattern,
assigns them some desired false label, and inserts these
samples into the training data. Then, the model is forced
to learn not only the correct information from the current
task, but also the association of the backdoor pattern
and the false label. This compromised training process
can (but need not) be continued with any or all of the
incoming tasks.
The vulnerability of a CL algorithm comes from its
very intended goal, which the attacker deliberately uses
against the algorithm: since the algorithm is designed
to retain prior knowledge by avoiding forgetting, the
misinformation provided by the attacker is also retained
and not forgotten. Once the adversary has control of the
model with the backdoor pattern, it can dramatically
increase the amount of forgetting on any particular
previous task at deployment (inference) time.
Let Xtb represent the backdoor samples inserted into
the training data of the current task and ytb be their
corresponding incorrect labels. The loss function that
will be minimized during the training of current task
with the backdoor samples can then be expressed as:
`( fθ) =`[ fθ(Xt ∪ Xtb), (yt ∪ ytb)]
+ λ∑
i
(θt,i − θ∗t−1,i)2 It−1,i (3)
Once the model is trained, the test examples from the
previous task are presented to the model in order to
measure the forgetting of the model on the previous task.
For those test examples that do not contain the backdoor
pattern, i.e., Xt, the prediction of the model should be
(mostly) correct, f (Xt) ≈ yt. Test samples that contain
the backdoor pattern, however, will be misclassified as
the attacker’s desired label, resulting in f (Xtb) = y
t
b 6= yt.
Such an attack naturally leads to loss of knowledge on
prior tasks as the process continues with future tasks,
each carrying backdoor attacks. We expect the attacker
to achieve its goal with greater success if it has access to
the training data of all tasks; however, as we show, the
loss of knowledge on a particular previous task can be
achieved even if the attacker has access to the training
data of only a single future task. Backdoor attacks are
therefore a particularly serious threat to the continually-
learning model.
IV. Experiments & Results
We use the two most common continual learning
benchmark datasets, permuted MNIST [1], [14] and split
MNIST [14] in our experiments. For permuted MNIST,
we create a sequence of 5 different tasks, where each
task is obtained through applying a different randomly
generated permutation to the image pixels. Each task
in permuted MNIST is a 10-class problem: the first task
is to classify original ten MNIST digits; each other task
involves classifying the same ten digits with a different,
but fixed, random permutation applied to all digits. For
split MNIST, the original MNIST dataset is split into 5
different tasks, where each task is a binary classification
problem: the first task is to distinguish between digits 0
and 1, the second task is to distinguish between digits 2
and 3, and so on.
We use the same implementation of EWC as described
in [23]. A multilayer perceptron with 2 hidden layers—
each containing 400 neurons—is used with the rectified
nonlinear (ReLU) activation function, as suggested in
[23]. The backdoor pattern, representing the misinforma-
tion, is a 3×3 square block inserted at the bottom right
corner of the 28×28 image as shown in Fig. 1.
Since the goal of the attacker is the loss of prior
knowledge, i.e., maximizing the forgetting of a particular
previous task, we evaluate the model’s performance (and
hence the attacker’s success) on the initial task, after the
model is attacked at some or all of the later tasks. For
each dataset, we consider three different attack scenarios:
sustained attacks, short-term attacks, and acute attacks.
For each scenario, we compare the model’s test-time
performance on three separate sub-scenarios: i) where
Fig. 1. A clean sample (left) and the identical sample with the backdoor
pattern (right). The backdoor pattern is the small gray square located
in the lower right corner.
there are no backdoor attack points in either the training
or test data; ii) where attack points are added only to
the training data (with no backdoor patterns in the test
data, and iii) where there are backdoor patterns in both
the training and test data, the last of which is in fact the
process for all typical backdoor attacks.
A. Attacking Continual Learning on Permuted MNIST
1) Sustained Attack Scenario: The first attack scenario
we consider for permuted MNIST allows an attacker to
have access to the training data for all tasks except the
initial one, the target task on which the attacker wants
to inflict maximum damage. We call this the sustained
attack scenario. In this setting, we create a small number
of malicious samples by inserting a 3×3 square grid
(the backdoor) pattern into only 1% of training data.
We assume that the incorrect target label the attacker
wants to assign to these malicious samples is of class
0; therefore the 1% malicious data are randomly drawn
from all labels except class 0 (recall that each task is
a 10-class classification problem in permuted MNIST).
The incorrectly-labeled malicious samples (containing
backdoor patterns) are then added to the clean training
data, and the model is trained using regularization-
based continual learning under the EWC algorithm, first
on the clean data for the initial task and subsequently
on the compromised training data for each of the four
subsequent tasks.
At inference time, we compute test accuracy on each
task under each of the three sub-scenarios. Recall that the
attacker’s objective is to compromise Task 1; hence, in
all tasks except the first task, test examples are presented
to the model without the backdoor pattern, in order to
monitor the model’s ability to retain performance on
untargeted tasks. While the amount of malicious training
data remains constant at 1%, we vary the amount of
malicious test data in the third sub scenario to be 10%,
25% and 50% in order to determine precisely how much
control the attacker can seize over the model through the
backdoor attacks at inference time. The test accuracy of
each task and the average accuracy across all tasks for
TABLE I
Test accuracy for sustained attack on permuted MNIST. The training data of every task, except the first, contains backdoor tagged
images, at a ratio of 1%. The test time performance of the classifier on Task 1 is in bold.
Tasks
No backdoor in
training or test data
Backdoor in train-
ing data only
10% backdoor in
test data of Task 1
25% backdoor in
test data of Task 1
50% backdoor in
test data of Task 1
Task 1 0.9779 0.9797 0.9196 0.8332 0.6864
Task 2 0.9755 0.9743 0.9743 0.9743 0.9743
Task 3 0.9719 0.9662 0.9662 0.9662 0.9662
Task 4 0.9669 0.9577 0.9577 0.9577 0.9577
Task 5 0.9626 0.9481 0.9481 0.9481 0.9481
Avg. Accuracy 0.9710 0.9652 0.9532 0.9359 0.9065
TABLE II
Test accuracy for short-term attack on permuted MNIST. Only the training data for the last two tasks contain backdoor tagged
images, at a ratio of 1%. The test time performance of the classifier on Task 1 is in bold.
Tasks
No backdoor in
training or test data
Backdoor in train-
ing data only
10% backdoor in
test data of Task 1
25% backdoor in
test data of Task 1
50% backdoor in
test data of Task 1
Task 1 0.9779 0.9804 0.9649 0.9429 0.9043
Task 2 0.9755 0.9717 0.9717 0.9717 0.9717
Task 3 0.9719 0.9681 0.9681 0.9681 0.9681
Task 4 0.9669 0.9601 0.9601 0.9601 0.9601
Task 5 0.9626 0.9478 0.9478 0.9478 0.9478
Avg. Accuracy 0.9710 0.9656 0.9625 0.9581 0.9504
TABLE III
Test accuracy for acute attack on permuted MNIST. Only the training data for the last task contains backdoor tagged images, at
a ratio of 1%. The test time performance of the classifier on Task 1 is in bold.
Tasks
No backdoor in
training or test data
Backdoor in train-
ing data only
10% backdoor in
test data of Task 1
25% backdoor in
test data of Task 1
50% backdoor in
test data of Task 1
Task 1 0.9779 0.9805 0.9670 0.9479 0.9136
Task 2 0.9755 0.9727 0.9727 0.9727 0.9727
Task 3 0.9719 0.9687 0.9687 0.9687 0.9687
Task 4 0.9669 0.9569 0.9569 0.9569 0.9569
Task 5 0.9626 0.9470 0.9470 0.9470 0.9470
Avg. Accuracy 0.9710 0.9652 0.9625 0.9586 0.9518
each of the aforementioned scenarios are presented in
Table I.
We observe that the attacker can successfully force
the model to forget a specifically targeted information
(Task 1) by corrupting just 1% of the training and 10%
of the test data. It is important to note that the corrupted
images are identical to the clean images, with the sole
exception of the small 3×3 square pattern on the lower
right corner. Hence, even a tiny perturbation to the
raw image can be used with malicious intent and still
demonstrate a brutal efficiency.
The model’s accuracy drops from 0.9779 (no backdoor
during the training)—or 0.9797 (1% backdoor tagged
images in the training but none at test time)—down to
0.9196 when 10% of the test data are corrupted. The
drop in the performance is far more dramatic when 50%
of the test samples from the first task are presented
to the model with backdoor tags, with a reduction in
accuracy to 0.6864. This precipitous drop shows that an
attacker can easily trick the memory of a continually-
learning model for a particular task by presenting only
1% of misinformation during the training of other tasks.
Importantly, the precise nature of the attack avoids neg-
ative impact to the untargeted tasks, demonstrating its
stealthiness and difficulty of detection.
2) Short-Term Attack Scenario: We consider a shorter-
term attack, where the attacker has access to the training
data for only the last two tasks. Again, the malicious
training samples are created by adding backdoor pat-
terns to 1% of the training data, but only for the last
two tasks. The model is then trained on clean data
for the first three tasks, and compromised data on the
last two tasks. After training is completed on all five
tasks, clean test examples are presented to the model
at inference time for all tasks except the targeted first
task, whose test examples are presented with 10%, 25%,
and 50% containing backdoor attack tagged images. The
test accuracy of individual tasks along with the average
accuracy over all tasks are shown in Table II.
We observe from Table II that the attacker is once
again able to successfully reduce the test accuracy of
the first task, forcing the model to forget the knowledge
learned on a specific, targeted task, without affecting the
performance on other tasks. We note that even though
the absolute quantity of malicious samples provided to
the model during training was halved, the attacker was
still able to force a nearly 8% decrease in accuracy.
3) Acute Attack Scenario: We now consider an acute
attack, where an attacker has access only to the training
data of a single task. Here, it is assumed that some
amount of time has passed since the target task was
learned, and only now does the attacker wish to attack
the model. As with the previous scenarios, a poisoned
sample comprising only 1% of the training dataset for
the last task is added to the training data. Also as
before, clean test samples from the untargeted tasks are
presented to the model at inference time, while test
samples from the target task are contaminated at a rate
of 10%, 25%, and 50% across the experiments. The results
obtained from this scenario are shown in Table III.
Our primary observation from Table III is that al-
though the misinformation was provided only during
the last task during training, this tiny amount of mis-
information was sufficient to trick the EWC model’s
memory of the first task at inference time, forcing a
nearly 7% reduction in accuracy—similar damage as
in the short-term attack scenario. The results shown in
Table III suggest that such a backdoor method may be a
critical vulnerability for any similar online learner, as the
attacker is able to impact the performance of any task at
any point after that task has been learned, with only a
miniscule amount of poisoning.
B. Attacking Continual Learning on Split MNIST
Split MNIST is a fundamentally different, and consid-
erably more challenging, incremental learning problem,
as it includes five different sequential binary classifi-
cation problems. Here, all 10 classes must be learned
from consecutive, mutually exclusive tasks, but only two
classes at a time. Specifically, Task 1 requires distinguish-
ing class 0 from class 1, Task 2 requires distinguishing
class 2 from class 3, and so on. We consider the same
training scenarios and setup as we did in permuted
MNIST, and follow the same training protocols. As
before, the attacker targets Task 1 and seeks to make
the model forget what it has learned for Task 1 by intro-
ducing misinformation through backdoor attacks during
training for subsequent tasks. One important difference
compared to permuted MNIST is the assignment of the
false label to the backdoor tagged images. In permuted
MNIST, all tasks had all of the same 10 classes; the
attacker drew samples from classes 1 through 9, tagged
them with backdoor pattern, and assigned the same false
label ”0”. For split MNIST, however, each task has a
different set of two classes. Therefore, for each pair of
classes in any given task, the backdoor tagged images
were sampled from the latter class and the false label
applied is that of the former class. (e.g., in Task 2—class
2 vs. class 3—attack samples were drawn from images
of 3 and assigned the false label of 2). We expect this
mechanism to force the CL algorithm to assign any one
of the (four) false labels when a backdoor tagged test
sample from the first task is presented at inference time.
1) Sustained Attack Scenario: As in permuted MNIST
case, this scenario allows the adversary to have access
to training data of all tasks except Task 1 (the target),
thereby attacking each training sessions for Tasks 2
through 5. The model is hence trained, first on clean
data from Task 1, and then sequentially on each of the
subsequent tasks, each poisoned with 1% compromised
data. The test accuracy is computed, again under three
sub scenarios, with backdoor attack points added (in a
ratio of 1%) to: i) neither the training nor test data; ii) only
the training data; and iii) the training data with 10%,
25% or 50% attack points also added to test data. The
test accuracy results are shown in Table IV.
We observe from Table IV that, similar to the cor-
responding permuted MNIST experiment, the attacker
can successfully force the model to forget specifically
targeted information (Task 1), with only 1% malicious
data on the training dataset, while leaving all other
tasks unaffected. Not affecting other (non-target) tasks is
important, as it limits the attack detection. The results on
increasing attack points on test data (from 10% to 50%)
shows that the drop in performance is proportional to
the amount of malicious test data, giving the attacker the
complete control of the algorithm. We further note again
that the detection of misinformation is also difficult as
the attack images are added not to the targeted task,
but rather to subsequent tasks, where attacks are less
expected.
2) Short-Term Attack Scenario: Similar to the permuted
MNIST case, we consider a shorter attack sequence—
attacking only the last two tasks—instead of attacking
all tasks, as was done in sustained attack scenario. In
this case, the attacker has access only to the training
data of the last two tasks, with the attack protocol being
otherwise identical to previous case. The test accuracy of
individual tasks, along with the average accuracy over all
tasks, is shown in Table V.
Table V shows similar trends as in permuted MNIST
case: i) the attacker is once again able to force the model
to forget the knowledge learned on a specific, targeted
task (Task 1), without affecting the performance on other
tasks; and ii) the attacker is able to do so by attacking
only the last two tasks—unrelated to the target task—
and long after the target task has already been learned.
Perhaps more surprisingly, unlike permutedMNIST the
test accuracy drops significantly when backdoor tagged
images are included in the test data, with the perfor-
mance drop proportional to the amount of backdoor
images, indicating that the attacker assumes complete
control over its target, Task 1.
3) Acute Attack Scenario: Finally, the last scenario we
consider for attacking split MNIST is the one where the
attacker only adds backdoor samples (misinformation)
to the training data of a single task. As before, we
assume that some amount of time has passed between
the time that the model has learned the target task and
the time when the attacker wishes to impact the model’s
performance on that task.
The inconvenient truth for the model, as demonstrated
TABLE IV
Test accuracy for sustained attack on split MNIST. The training data for every task except the first task contains backdoor tagged
images, at a ratio of 1%. The test time performance of the classifier on Task 1 is in bold.
Tasks
No backdoor in
training or test data
Backdoor in train-
ing data only
10% backdoor in
test data of Task 1
25% backdoor in
test data of Task 1
50% backdoor in
test data of Task 1
Task 1 0.9811 0.9858 0.9466 0.8799 0.7608
Task 2 0.9882 0.9931 0.9931 0.9931 0.9931
Task 3 0.9979 0.9952 0.9952 0.9952 0.9952
Task 4 0.9945 0.9960 0.9960 0.9960 0.9960
Task 5 0.9929 0.9914 0.9914 0.9914 0.9914
Avg. Accuracy 0.9909 0.9923 0.9845 0.9711 0.9473
TABLE V
Test accuracy for short-term attack on split MNIST. Only the training data for the last two tasks contain backdoor tagged
images, at a ratio of 1%. The test time performance of the classifier on Task 1 is in bold.
Tasks
No backdoor in
training or test data
Backdoor in train-
ing data only
10% backdoor in
test data of Task 1
25% backdoor in
test data of Task 1
50% backdoor in
test data of Task 1
Task 1 0.9811 0.9825 0.9452 0.8785 0.7598
Task 2 0.9882 0.9936 0.9936 0.9936 0.9936
Task 3 0.9979 0.9979 0.9979 0.9979 0.9979
Task 4 0.9945 0.9930 0.9930 0.9930 0.9930
Task 5 0.9929 0.9914 0.9914 0.9914 0.9914
Avg. Accuracy 0.9909 0.9917 0.9842 0.9709 0.9471
TABLE VI
Test accuracy for acute attack on split MNIST. Only the training data for the last task contains backdoor tagged images, at a
ratio of 1%. The test time performance of the classifier on Task 1 is in bold.
Tasks
No backdoor in
training or test data
Backdoor in train-
ing data only
10% backdoor in
test data of Task 1
25% backdoor in
test data of Task 1
50% backdoor in
test data of Task 1
Task 1 0.9811 0.9636 0.9281 0.8638 0.7513
Task 2 0.9882 0.9912 0.9912 0.9912 0.9912
Task 3 0.9979 0.9973 0.9973 0.9973 0.9973
Task 4 0.9945 0.9945 0.9945 0.9945 0.9945
Task 5 0.9929 0.9924 0.9924 0.9924 0.9924
Avg. Accuracy 0.9909 0.9878 0.9807 0.9678 0.9453
by the results in Table VI, is that the attack process
we describe here is not only ruthlessly efficient (with
only 1% malicious data in the training set), but also has
an impact remarkably similar to that of the previous
two scenarios. As with prior experiments, the attacker
is able to successfully force the model to forget Task 1
knowledge, and furthermore is able to exert control over
the level of forgetting by varying the amount of backdoor
images in the test samples, all attacking only the last
training session only.
What is perhaps more surprising, however, is the
performance drop being slightly more severe in the acute
attack scenario compared to the sustained and short-
term attack scenarios—the opposite of what was ob-
served in the permuted MNIST experiments. While the
difference in performance drop from sustained or short
term attack to acute attack appears to be marginal, we do
not think this is just statistical margin of error. Rather,
we think the performance drop is meaningful in part
because it is associated with a much weaker attack. More
specifically, we believe that the higher severity in the
acute attack is due to the different treatment of the
false labels in the split MNIST experiments: while the
false labels in the permuted MNIST experiments were
universally set to class 0, the false labels in the split
MNIST experiments are distributed over several class
labels and are set to “the first class in the two-class
task”. Because the backdoor tag is intended to become
associated with the false label(s), it follows that this asso-
ciation will be stronger when the associated is with only
a small number of such false labels. In contrast, when
the backdoor is associated with many labels, as in the
case of the sustained attack, the association with any of
these labels becomes weaker, and the model is forced to
rely on other, genuine features to make its classification
decisions. At test time, the distributed nature of the false
labels results in the model being less “distracted” by the
presence of the backdoor, because the backdoor is a less-
informative feature than the actual handwritten digit.
Nevertheless, all three attacks demonstrate a powerful
ability to hinder the model’s performance, even on a task
learned previously learned with near-perfect accuracy.
Indeed, the ability of the attacker to have such catas-
trophic impact, even with a minimal amount of leverage
against the model—at a point even far in the future
relative to the time when the task was initially learned—
should be highly worrying, as it demonstrates the lack of
robustness of CL algorithms against adversarial attacks.
V. Conclusions & Future Work
We have shown that elastic weight consolidation
(EWC), a commonly-used regularization-based continual
learning approach, is vulnerable to backdoor poisoning
attacks. This vulnerability exists due to the way that
EWC functions in retaining information from task-to-
task. While EWC exhibits remarkable results for its
intended function, an attacker may exploit the algorithm
by teaching it to retain misinformation. We demonstrated
this capability of the attacker through the utilization
of backdoor attacks, designed to create a weakness in
the continual learner by which an attacker can induce
a pinpoint degradation in performance at its leisure.
While backdoor attacks have been previously shown to
be effective at highlighting the vulnerability of stationary
image recognition systems, we show for the first time
that they can also be an effective tool in defeating
continual learners in an online setting.
The natural immediate next steps are to explore the
vulnerabilities of not only other regularization-based
continual learning approaches, but also to investigate
whether similar weaknesses exist in both data-based
and architecture-based methods. In this effort, we only
looked at a very small amount of poisoned data in-
troduced using a backdoor pattern of fixed shape and
intensity. Our future work will also include determining
the impact of the amount of poisoned data in the training
dataset, as well as the impact of the shape and intensity
of the backdoor pattern. Perhaps equally important to
demonstrating these vulnerabilities is to develop appro-
priate defensive solutions agains such attacks.
An important takeaway from this work is to reempha-
size the critical need for any future algorithm seeking
artificial general intelligence to be cognizant to adver-
sarial threats; this work shows that there is still much
to address in the area of adversarial machine learning.
Therefore, it will be important to prioritize the devel-
opment of robust learning systems, as well as defenses
against adversarial attacks, such that a continual learner
will be able to learn from streaming data while remain-
ing secure against deliberate misdirection.
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